LSP5 Consultation Full and Supplementary Submission – “driven purely by misguided and unnecessary financial reasons”
Response to LSP5 consultation
Introduction
Whilst the LSP5 consultation document contains much to commend it in terms of fire prevention and fire safety, and recognition of the need to redeploy some appliances to areas of growing population, the key thrust of the document, the cuts to front line fire fighting capacity of 12 fire stations, 18 pumps and 520 fire-fighter posts is unacceptable.
I believe this is driven purely by misguided and unnecessary financial reasons; does not provide equity between Londoners; does not reflect all the risks especially special services such as road accidents and the needs of resilience; will cost lives and injury; unfairly impacts on central London, especially Camden in my constituency; and is undemocratic and discriminatory.
Financial reasons
It is clear from the Fire Commissioner’s response to the Mayor’s direction to consult on the LSP5 cuts, that these cuts are the consequence of the Mayor’s decision to starve the fire brigade of the finances it needs.
The cuts of £45 million may sound a lot, but represent only 0.4% of the GLA total budget. It is the small change down the back of Boris Johnson’s sofa. This is in addition to the £66 million already cut by the brigade, without significant impact on front line fire- fighting, but still with significant impact on other brigade functions.
The London Assembly produced a balanced budget that demonstrated these cuts were not necessary. Indeed LFEPA produced a budget for the current year, predicated on the assumption that the cuts were not factored in for the current year. Nevertheless, it is understood that the intention is to start the cuts in the current year, from the autumn. This would “save” £9m- equivalent to 1p a day on the council tax at band D, the amount the Mayor cut the council tax for this year. £45 million represents 5p a day at band D. If the Mayor reconsidered his decision to reduce his share of the council tax precept during the course of his current term, and like other local authorities instead merely froze it, that would generate twice the sum being cut, in round terms.
Alternatively, the money could be found by viring between other GLA budgets, for example TfL. It should be remembered that £50 million was taken from the LFEPA budget to vire into the police budget and there is no reason why other budgets could not be adjusted to support the fire brigade in a similar way, if the Mayor had the political will to do so.
It is also clear that LFEPA has not done all it can to maximise income. There is a considerable amount of residential property throughout the estate which is lying vacant, including at the two stations which serve my constituency, Clerkenwell and Belsize. That residential property could be a source of considerable income if brought back into use, for example as key worker housing for fire or police personnel, perhaps in partnership with a housing association to handle the refurbishment and management of the property. The suspicion is that on the contrary, stations were chosen for closure in the basis of their real estate value, with a view to their sale, which is to sell off the family silver rather than see the vacant residential accommodation as a valuable source of income. The sale value was one of the criteria for closure in the earlier draft of LSP5, and the stations now for closure were also on the original list in that document.
The cuts also do not take into account the cost to society more generally of the consequences. This includes the increase in domestic insurance premiums which will inevitably follow a decrease in fire cover, especially for those areas which will see their attendance times increase beyond the 6/8 minute attendance time targets, and which will cost residents far more than they will save in any small cut in the Mayor’s council tax precept.
The cost to society also includes the more general cost of fire property damage and the cost of injuries and deaths that might otherwise have been avoided or reduced, either through fire or road accidents or other hazards, due to slower attendance from the brigade. In 2010 RoSPA commissioned research to look into the true cost to society of home accidents. Its findings were shocking: the cost per fatality is estimated at £1.61million and of serious injury £45,600. These costs, as well as the cost of property damage have not been put in the balance sheet as against the amount to be cut from the fire budget.
Equity between Londoners
Whilst the aim of equalising the fire brigade response so far as is practical across London is a laudable one, the crude measure of attendance times as currently measured does not provide this.
The current standard is based on measuring the time between the mobilising message being received at the fire station and the time the officer in charge books in attendance at the incident. This is not the time that the call is made at the start of the incident, nor the time active fire-fighting operations actually start at the incident.
If all properties in London were the same and all the population was the same, then this would be a fair measure, but they are not.
London is a diverse city, but that diversity is not equally spread. In the areas that are facing the greatest increase in attendance times, including moving from within to beyond the target attendance times, the population is more diverse and with a greater proportion of people who do not speak English or who have English as a second language. The mobilisation message for brigade control in response to a 999 call may therefore take correspondingly longer to process, bearing in mind for example the need to engage language line interpreter services, when compared on average to areas that are not seeing the lion’s share of the cuts. A fairer way of measuring the start therefore, on average, would be to take the start of the timing operation from the time of the first 999 call being received at control, not the time the mobilising message is received, to take account of this diversity.
In terms of booking in attendance, this may achieve “horizontal” equity, but not “vertical” equity. There are a far greater proportion of taller buildings in the areas facing the worst cuts, than in the areas that are not. The Lakanal House fire, and many other tall building fires, demonstrate that it takes far longer for active fire-fighting operations to commence, compared with for example, a fire in a low rise semi detached or terraced property. Whist some preparatory work may be done at a high rise fire, for example laying out hose, the active operation may not commence for a further 15 minutes as was seen at Lakanal House. Fire crews cannot be committed to a fire on, say the 10th floor of a tower block until adequate resources are available to do so safely.
Whilst some may argue that if buildings are constructed properly and fire precautions are in place this delay should not pose additional hazards, that is often not the case as Lakanal House demonstrated. Buildings are adapted and modified. People do wrongly use fire extinguishers to prop open fire doors. Fire doors are often not properly installed or maintained. Older buildings are not constructed to modern fire protection standards. Human error occurs and the brigade cannot proceed in its planning on the basis of a counsel of perfection when real life is not like that.
A fairer measure for the “end” time that is to be measured would be when active fire fighting or rescue operations commence, rather than merely when the attendance is booked in; or to factor in for those areas with a much higher proportion of high rise, an additional measure to at least take account of the 3rd appliance attendance.
The net result of the use of the crude attendance time measure as applied in LSP5, and as the Commissioner put it at public consultation meetings, is that there will be “winners and losers”. Overall, Londoners will be losers, seeing attendance times increase by 15 and 16 seconds respectively for 1st and 2nd attendance. 4.8 million Londoners will see longer attendance times. That, though, is not the end of the story, with wildly differing results across the capital, with a few seconds improvement in some outer London boroughs at the expense of dramatically increased times in central London, even without taking into account the additional factors of greater diversity and a greater number high rise buildings referred to above.
Moreover, borough wide averages mask significant local increases at the ward level, as I demonstrate below in connection with my own constituency.
Special services and resilience
I do not believe the LSP5 document fairly reflects the demands of special services, especially road accidents.
We have seen a growing increase in road accidents in central London, especially involving cyclists and HGVs, requiring rescues. These rescues must be effected as quickly as possible as the injuries can be life threatening or life changing. Whist the LSP5 document considers fire deaths, it does not consider the full impact on road accident (or other rescue) deaths or injuries, which are not recorded in the same way. An assessment should be made of the numbers and seriousness of rescues, where the significantly increased central London attendance times will result in casualties not surviving or suffering more serious consequences, than if the current attendance times were maintained.
I am also concerned about resilience in the event of major incidents. For example, at one of the public meetings, the Commissioner indicated that in response to the riots of 2 years ago, 98 pumps from the brigade’s then fleet of 169 were deployed. That left 71 pumps to provide cover for all other fire and rescue risks and demands in the normal course of the brigade’s operations. If these cuts proceed, then there would only be 53 left, due to the gearing effect of the cuts, should there be riots in the future on a similar scale (or indeed other major emergencies raising similar demands). It should also be born in mind that the neighbouring county brigades have also made major cuts, especially in stations bordering London, so their ability to provide support or cover to London in the event of a major incident is also reduced. Indeed LSP5 reflects these cuts in neighbouring brigades, by suggesting that there should be recharges to them, due to the imbalance between London appliances attending incidents in their areas, compared to the inward support received from them.
Lives and injuries
The argument advanced in support of the cuts is that there are fewer fires so we need fewer fire-fighters. The fact that fires have reduced in number is a tribute to the work of the brigade in promoting fire safety, but this justification is a bit like saying, as one member of the public put it at one of the public meetings, just because no-one has drowned in a swimming pool then no life guard is needed; or if crime goes down we should cut the police force. The answer is that if it takes longer to get to a fire, then it will become a more serious incident, and the proposed cuts in fire stations mean that for large parts of London, it will take longer for the fire appliances to arrive.
This is illustrated by comparing the period October to December 2009 with the same period in 2010 during the dispute, when 27 appliances were not available. Dwelling fires classed as “serious” increased from 24% to 34%, with “slight” fires correspondingly fewer, suggesting that the removal of fire appliances leads to a greater intensity of fires, due to the longer time it takes for the brigade to arrive.
The fire spread exponential curve suggests that fires can quadruple in intensity in 2 minutes. The LSP5 document itself (background paper 8) acknowledges that during real fire tests in a block of flats due for demolition, a replicated living area fire resulted in a flashover after 5 minutes and that “anyone still in the room at the time of the flashover would be critically injured”.
The additional time to reach large parts of London will put lives at risk, both from fires and for road accidents and other rescues.
It is interesting to note that the brigade’s own target performance indicates the risk of increased fire deaths, from the current performance of 44, up to 56 in 2013/14, the current year in which it is intended the cuts will commence.
The impact can also be illustrated by a real event on 15th March, when a domestic “persons reported” fire occurred in Polthorne Grove SE18. Appliances from Plumstead and Woolwich were mobilised. Plumstead was caught in traffic and also took a wrong turn, arriving at 12 minutes. Woolwich was there in 7 minutes and their BA crew were able to effect a rescue of the unconscious occupant, who but for their actions would almost certainly have died, if she had had to wait until Plumstead arrived. Woolwich is one of the stations proposed for closure. It is no good blaming Plumstead for being late. Human error does occur in directions. Traffic can be heavier than predicted. That life would probably have been lost, if these cuts had taken effect before that fire occurred.
Central London and Camden
I now turn to the impact on my own constituency in Camden, which is affected not just by the proposed closure of Belsize but also of Clerkenwell (573 incidents in Camden attended in the last 6 months) and indeed the other central London stations for the chop, including Kingsland, Westminster, Knightsbridge, Southwark and Bow. Equally other London areas are affected by the closure of Belsize, which attends incidents in Westminster, (for example 153 mobilisations there in the last 6 months) Barnet , Brent, Islington Haringey, Enfield and Harrow.
The average increase in attendance times for Camden across the borough is predicted to be 45 seconds for the first pump and 26 seconds for the second, and we are assured that the 6/8 minute targets will be maintained across the borough.
However, Belsize ward’s attendance times will increase by 3.22 minutes to 7.59 minutes. Six wards will see their attendance times increase by over a minute: Belsize, Haverstock, Camden Town with Primrose Hill, Holborn and Covent Garden, Swiss Cottage, and Hampstead Town.
Seven wards will be over the 6 minute target for the first appliance: Belsize, Camden Town with Primrose Hill, Gospel Oak, Hampstead Town, Haverstock, Kilburn and Swiss Cottage.
It can be seen therefore, that drilling down into the figures produces a very different picture from that suggested in LSP5.
The reality can be illustrated by recent experience at Belsize. On 15th November 2012, there was a fire in Belsize Park Gardens. Belsize were standing by elsewhere, so the call was taken by West Hampstead who arrived at just over 7 minutes. Two days later, there was a fire in the same address: Belsize arrived at 1.35 minutes, as they had far less distance to travel.
On 21st February 2013, there was a fire in a school in Strathray Gardens, NW3. Belsize arrived in less than 2 minutes; the next appliance from West Hampstead took 9 minutes. The Belsize crew were able to reduce the fire damage to the school and prevent spread to the surrounding parts of the building. Luckily, the fire was at half term, so no children were there, but the consequences would potentially have been far more serious, if the incident had occurred when the school was in term and if Belsize had already been cut.
The proposals to reduce fire cover for Camden fail to take into account the extent of fire risk in the borough.
Camden Council alone owns 41 buildings over 8 stories high, a fraction of the overall total in the borough.
It contains over 5,600 listed buildings, more than anywhere else in the country of historic or architectural importance. Many of these older buildings from the 17th and 18th centuries are timber framed with high internal ventilation which aids fire spread, and are found in areas with high densities. They present particular fire risks, often with poor internal access and escape, and are very vulnerable both to fire and to damage from fire-fighting.
Culturally, Camden includes locations of international importance, including but not limited to the British Library, the British Museum, the Welcome Trust, Sir John Soane Museum, and Kenwood House, all of which present important and difficult fire-fighting challenges in protecting the collections and buildings.
Transport hubs include mainline stations including Euston, Kings Cross and St Pancras International, as well as many local stations and tube stations, including King’s Cross, the location of the devastating fire in 1987.
Major hospitals include the Royal Free, UCLH and Great Ormond Street Children’s Hospital and the new Francis Crick Institute and higher education institutions such as UCL and LSE.
Camden Town and Covent Garden are both incredibly busy venues at weekends and in the evening, including many visitors not familiar with the local geography. In 2008 there was the major fire in Camden market.
Camden contains many prime targets for terrorism too, including many of the above premises: it is the most bombed location in the UK already!
Camden’s population is expected to increase by 7% by 2016, primarily in the less affluent areas of the borough. Camden is in the top 10 authorities in the country for population churn, including in the 3 LSOAs (Lower Super Output Area) that are amongst the 10% most deprived in the country. 58 out of 133 Camden LSOAs are in the 30% most derived in the country.
Camden is also extremely diverse, including one of the largest Bangladeshi origin communities in the country, for example. At the last census, there were 14,055 (14.4%) households where no people have English as a main language.
The population density of Camden is 101 persons per hectare (compared to 91 in 2001), with 40.5% living in one person households. 85.2% of people live in flats, with a high proportion of people renting|: social rental 33.1%, private rental 32.3 %, of the total forms of tenure.
These are all factors which particularly sound in those vulnerable to fire risk, which does not seem to have been taken into account in LSP5.
Undemocratic and discriminatory.
It is only due to the direction of the Mayor, that this consultation is taking place. LFEPA itself made clear that it did not wish to make these cuts, which are damaging to the safety of Londoners. The Mayor is behaving in a profoundly undemocratic way in forcing LFEPA to proceed with the consultation and no doubt in due course, the cuts. Indeed it is debatable whether LFEPA have a legal duty to comply.
There is no explicit duty in the legislation in itself to comply: a mandatory duty to act should not be implied except in extreme circumstances. The statutory fire and rescue functions (in the Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004) are vested in the Authority, not the Mayor, and the Mayor’s powers of direction should not be interpreted as intended to usurp responsibility (and liability) for those functions as laid down in statute.
LFEPA is a politically constituted legal entity separate from the Mayor (consisting of a politically balanced representation from borough councillors and Assembly members, plus 2 Mayoral appointees). The drafting of the GLA Act 2009 should be interpreted as intended to allow differences between the Mayor and the Authority to be resolved politically, as part of a deliberate system of political checks and balances (along the lines of the American constitution), without the Mayor having an overarching right to issue a decree thwarting the exercise by the Authority of its statutory responsibilities.
Moreover, the equality duties in section 149(1) of the Equality Act 2010 apply to LFEPA. It is clear there is a disproportionate impact under LSP5 and insufficient consideration has been given to this, in the context of a comprehensive impact assessment, considering not just ethnicity, but also deprivation factors. 76 out of the 100 most deprived wards in London will see an increase in attendance times, and for the reasons outlined above, these are factors that are particularly indicative of a greater fire risk.
Andrew Dismore AM
June 2013
Click here to download my LSP5 consultation submission in PDF format
Supplementary submission – 17th June 2013:
Introduction
Further to my previous submission, I wish to add a comment concerning the just released information concerning 3rd pump attendance times, with particular reference to Camden.
In 2001/12, 879 incidents in Camden needed a 3rd (or more) appliance in attendance, representing 14.1% of the overall total of incidents attended. The consequences of draft LSP 5 will mean that for similar incidents in future, if the draft is adopted as it stands, on average, we will see an extra 55 seconds for the third pump to arrive, an increase in time of 12.3%.
It can be expected that at individual ward level for some local neighbourhoods the consequences will be more striking, bearing in mind the particular Camden wards where we already know the consequence will be that the first and second attendances will stretch beyond the target attendance times. These wards will do considerably worse than the 45 second additional delay in attendance, which is in itself unacceptable.
My previous submission set out in detail how Camden has a peculiar and unique mix of fire risk, which is reflected by the need for so many 3rd pump (or more) incidents. These risks include not just high rise flats and business premises and the density of residential occupation, but special risks like three major rail termini and teaching hospitals, as well as cultural centres like our museums and galleries of international reputation, universities and their halls of residence, and the highest number of listed buildings in the country.
I anticipate that this argument will only get stronger once a more detailed analysis of 3 pump incidents can be made, but given the very short time available before the close of the consultation there is insufficient time to do this work due to the late provision of the data on these incidents.
The additional time for the 3rd pump make the prosed cuts to the London Fire Brigade overall and in particular for Camden, especially the closures of Belsize and Clerkenwell Fire Stations, unacceptable.
